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In this article the author analyses the situation of 
Chile's agriculture and economy in two periods. In 
the first, from the end of 1973 to June 1981, the 
economy grew at a high rate, inflation fell, wages 
rose, fiscal surpluses were achieved and reserves 
built up. In contrast, unemployment grew sharply, 
investment and saving fell, income distribution dete-
riorated, and the private sector's debt reached very 
high levels. The balance-of-payments deficit, the 
worsening of the terms of trade, the higher interest 
rates and the very large foreign debt acted as detona-
tors of a crisis which stamped its mark on the second 
period. This period, from 1981 on, is characterized 
by the introduction of various adjustment measures 
designed to correct the imbalances without altering 
the essential nature of the adopted model. 
The first measures introduced in agriculture 
had the objective of suspending the agrarian reform, 
restoring 30% of the expropriated land to its former 
owners and allocating the rest as smallholdings, and 
opening up the land market. A number of specific 
measures were also introduced, including forestry 
subsidies in particular. Other more general initia-
tives such as derestriction of the labour and capital 
markets and trade liberalization shaped the frame-
work within which agriculture operated. This period 
saw spectacular growth in exports production, espe-
cially fruits, and a sharp drop in traditional crops 
such as wheat, beet, rape and marigolds. 
Having abandoned the idea of automatic adjust-
ment to overcome the crisis, the authorities inter-
vened and established reference prices, purchase 
powers, tariff surcharges, price bands, and special 
credits for producers of basic goods. Taking 1981 as 
the reference point, agriculture performed better 
than the economy as a whole, owing largely to the 
strength of traditional crops and the expansion of 
fruit-growing, which benefited very much from the 
devaluations and the falls in wages and financial 
costs. 
"liconomist. Consultant to the Joint liCI.Af./FAO 
Agriculture Division. 
Introduction 
This article on Chile analyses two periods. The 
first runs from the end of 1973 to mid-1981, 
when the new government initiated an eco-
nomic strategy which made substantial changes 
in traditional policies, including policies for the 
agricultural sector; and in the second period, 
from June 1981 onwards, various policies 
designed to correct the existing imbalances were 
carried out against a background of economic 
crisis. 
I 




1. The global economic model 
One of the main criteria which have guided the 
actions of the economic authorities is the belief 
that the State should not steer or control produc-
tion activities and that it is for the private sector 
to allocate resources in accordance with its moti-
vations and assessments. In other words, the 
State should take a neutral stance, i.e., it can 
neither stimulate nor discourage production 
activities. 
Accordingly, development policies, both sec-
toral and regional and of a business organization 
nature, should be eliminated or considerably 
reduced. 
In this context the role of activator is trans-
ferred from the discriminatory decisions of the 
State to the signals emitted by prices, which are 
transmitted through the operation of competi-
tive and decentralized markets free of any kind 
of governmental interference. The conclusion of 
this argument is that there is no need to use 
sectoral development policies and that it is 
enough to issue general directives valid for all 
activities. 
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2. The subsidiary State 
One of the main goals of the military govern-
ment was to reduce the size of the State. The 
implementation of its policies led to the privati-
zation of a number of medium-sized enterprises, 
mainly agro-industries, which were owned by 
the Production Development Corporation 
(CORFO) or other bodies such as the National 
Farm Trade Corporation (ECA). The private sec-
tor took over dairy and dehydration plants, poul-
try and pig farms, olive estates, fisheries, fruit 
stations, silos, refrigeration equipment, seed 
selection equipment, agro-industrial complexes, 
the VINEX wine corporation and the National 
Seeds Corporation. 
Similarly, the role of the National Forestry 
Corporation (CONAF) was reduced to a min-
imum and its place was taken by a system of 
subsidies for the private sector, to which were 
transferred forested land (60 000 ha) with nur-
series and sawmills. In addition, large cellulose 
plants and their forests were sold and many 
forestry properties owned by the State or by 
insurance funds were put up for auction, the 
process of agrarian reform was abruptly halted 
and a large part of the land was returned to its 
former owners, while the rest was allocated in 
individual smallholdings. The withdrawal of the 
public sector was much more serious with 
respect to its functions of promoting develop-
ment and assisting the technologically most 
backward and poorest rural sectors. 
The abandonment by the State of the first of 
these two functions meant the abolition of mea-
sures considered selective and discriminatory in 
favour of the farming sector. As a result, tariffs 
were made uniform, tax exemptions, selective 
loans and inputs subsidies were removed, inter-
est rates standardized and prices deregulated. 
Attempts were also made to transfer to the pri-
vate sector the functions of providing technical 
assistance through subsidies for small producers 
to enable them to contract services. 
3. Trade liberalization 
In the government's view, the Chilean economy 
enjoyed excessive self-sufficiency which must be 
sharply reduced, for it was one of the reasons for 
the slow rate of development. In other words, 
the excessive and discriminatory protectionism 
had caused inefficient allocation of resources. 
The government decided therefore to open up 
the economy to the exterior in order to facilitate 
the expansion of exports and an increased 
supply, this by import of goods for which the 
country has no comparative advantages. 
With this in view, and in order to improve 
the standards of internal efficiency, the govern-
ment established a single exchange rate, which 
was to reflect the social value of foreign 
exchange, and a very low and uniform customs 
tariff, and it sought to remove the obstacles to 
foreign trade; at the same time it eliminated the 
customs exemptions which favoured certain 
production activities and the consumption of 
certain products. These measures were put 
swiftly into effect: the single exchange rate was 
set at 39 pesos to the dollar ¡n June 1979 and 
tariffs were reduced to a uniform 10%, with very 
few exceptions to this rule. 
These measures entailed important changes 
for the agriculture sector, for the import of goods 
already produced in the country was practically 
prohibited and the ECA had a monopoly of pur-
chases abroad when national output did not 
satisfy domestic consumption. It also acted as a 
compensation fund to smooth out the differen-
ces between the internal and external prices of 
the products which it imported, and so the most 
important had their prices fixed at levels below 
their external purchase cost. In accordance with 
the government's diagnosis, a consumption sub-
sidy was introduced and a tax imposed on pro-
ducers. A similar situation existed for inputs, for 
most inputs and capital goods for the sector were 
imported free of customs duties. 
Once these measures had been put into 
effect, the sector and its producers were exposed 
to increasingly intense foreign competition. 
As a transitional stage in its liberalization 
policy the government established between 1977 
and 1978 price bands based on the external 
market prices in the previous period, the system 
envisaged the use of variable tariffs when the 
external prices fell below the band's minimum. 
This mechanism worked for wheat and oil crops, 
but it was suspended at the request of the 
farmers themselves for the 1978/1980 harvest, 
for they thought that they could obtain better 
prices without the bands. 
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4. Prices policy and market 
intervention 
The military government planned to eliminate 
price controls, arguing that the market was the 
most efficient control mechanism. In accordance 
with this plan, prices were quickly deregulated, 
and at the same time governmental interference 
in the operation of the markets was reduced. 
This new policy meant profound changes for 
the sector, for prices had traditionally been fixed 
by the Department of Industry and Trade; this 
procedure was backed up by the ECA through its 
participation in market operations. Despite its 
convictions, the government had to move in 
stages with the deregulation of prices. After the 
first widespread deregulation, only maize, wheat 
and rice were still controlled in 1975, but in 1976, 
owing to the dire effects of this shock treatment 
on the people's living standards, controls were 
re-established for a wider range of products. 
However, most prices were again deregulated in 
1977, and the ECA used its purchase powers only 
for wheat, maize, rice, oils and wools, while at 
the same time it allowed private companies to 
import foodstuffs. The price bands machinery 
was established in the 1977/1978 season; the 
bands were set before the production cycle 
began, in order to reduce the risks to the 
producers. 
The instability of international markets 
finally persuaded the government not to inter-
vene in the operation of the markets, both for 
products and for inputs. 
5. Loans and interest rates 
In its economic policy the military government 
attached great importance to the capital market. 
Its diagnosis was that the biggest problems in 
this area were caused by excessive State interfer-
ence. It therefore decided to withdraw the State 
and encourage the installation and operation of 
new enterprises, while still retaining freedom to 
fix interest rates, eliminate selective loans and 
encourage international capital flows. 
Before the adoption of these measures the 
sector had traditionally operated with a high 
level of debt in relation to its value added, with 
heavy dependence on State sources of credit (the 
State Bank for short-term loans, CORFO for 
investment finance, and the Agrarian Reform 
Corporation (CORA) and the National Institute 
for Agricultural Development (INDAP) to cater 
to small owners) in addition to the special lines 
of subsidized loans. However, the government 
believed that the trade liberalization would 
improve profits so that there would be no need 
for special loans financed by these institutions, 
whose place would be taken by the private bank-
ing and financial system. 
Extremely high short-term interest rates 
prevailed between 1975 and 1978, seriously 
affecting agriculture. The causes of this were the 
abrupt deregulation of the capital market, espe-
cially of the interest rate, despite the serious 
economic instability caused by inflation; the low 
level of savings in the private sector and of 
working capital in business, a situation aggra-
vated by the inflation and the 1975/1976 reces-
sion; the difficulty of obtaining external 
financing as a result of the weak international 
supply and the restrictions imposed by the Cen-
tral Bank up to 1979; and the broad current 
spread, which was due both to the required levels 
of cash reserves and to the oligopolistic behav-
iour of the banking system. 
6. The labour market 
The government's policy in this area too meant 
great changes in the existing situation, the main 
measures adopted were the liberalization of the 
labour market by simplification of the legal rules 
governing recruitment and dismissal, and 
changes in the rules on relations between com-
panies and trade unions by reducing the sup-
posedly monopolistic powers of trade unions. 
This led in practice to the reduction of the politi-
cal, financial and institutional power of the trade 
unions and the suppression of the right to strike. 
Cuts were also made in labour "taxes", i.e., social 
security contributions, which were proportional 
to earnings and reached a rate of 60% in 1983, so 
that they were considered a disincentive to work. 
It must be added that unemployment 
remained high, contributing to the real fall in 
wages. 
7. The land market 
The idea rapidly gained ground in the military 
government that the land resource should be 
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treated as an additional capital good and that the 
restrictions on free trading in land should be 
removed. Among these restrictions the official 
diagnosis noted the uncertainty about rights of 
ownership caused by the agrarian reform and the 
appropriation of land, not to mention a whole 
series of restrictive legal regulations. The fol-
lowing were the most important measures 
adopted in this connection: 
i) As a first priority, about 30% of the physical 
area expropriated up to September 1973 was 
restored to its former owners (almost 10 
million ha). Most of this was better-quality 
land. 
Ü) Of the area actually expropriated (around 10 
million ha), 35% was allocated to the pea-
sants, 17% was transferred to other institu-
tions or sold off cheaply, and 18% was left 
unallocated. 
iii) The land was allocated to the peasants in 
individual plots, except in a small area of the 
dry coastal strip. The restrictions on the sale 
of this allocated land were removed at the 
same time, and it is estimated that 25% to 
40% of it was transferred to third parties. 
iv) After a series of modifications, the agrarian 
reform law was finally abrogated in 1978. 
v) Freedom was granted for subdivision of 
properties and sale of water rights. 
8. Tax policy 
The tendency here was to establish single taxes, 
as for example the value added tax (20%) and a 
tariff with similar features. At the same time a 
sharp reduction was made in tax exemptions, 
both regional and sectoral and for individual 
products. 
The progression of the income tax was also 
reduced, together with its contribution to total 
taxes, with a view to encouraging private saving 
and cutting the size of the public sector in accor-
dance with the government's thinking. 
The tax policy produced no major changes in 
the agricultural sector. Most of the enterprises 
remained under the system of presumed income, 
calculated as a percentage of the official valua-
tion, which is generally lower than the commer-
cial value. The establishment of the value added 
tax (VAT) extended the system to products 
which had formerly been exempt from taxes, 
However, the tax burden borne by the sector was 
lower than the national average, owing mainly 
to the system of presumed income. 
The forestry sector received special treat-
ment which included a one-off subsidy equival-
ent to 75% of the cost of forestation, and it was 
also exempt from the lad tax, taxes on presumed 
income, the supplementary general tax, and 
taxes on legacies, transfers and gifts. 
9. Research and the transfer 
of technology 
Here the government's policy was designed to 
secure financing for basic research and pass the 
cost of applied research on to the direct 
beneficiaries. 
Although the National Institute of Agricul-
tural Research is the main research body, steps 
were taken to reduce its influence. Forestry 
research is the responsibility of the Forestry 
Institute, the universities and private business. 
The policy of transfer of technology was 
given a serious setback by the provisions which 
ended the agrarian reform and the extension and 
training work of CORA and the Training and 
Research Institute for Agrarian Reform (ICIRA) 
and transferred their functions first to the SAG 
and then to INDAP, so that this body could 
concentrate the services on some 300 000 small-
holder families. This work was usually carried 
out on an individual basis with the peasants, 
without strengthening their organizations. 
A transfer of technology policy was not for-
mulated until 1978 with the establishment of the 
Technical-Business Assistance Programme 
(ATE) for small producers. An attempt was 
made to promote the establishment of 
Technical-Business Assistance Centres (CATE) 
to provide services for producers who required 
them, with State finance provided through sub-
sidies of between 56% and 70% of the value of 
the services. This programme had little success: 
in its best year (1980) it catered to 14 275 users 
but then declined sharply in the following years. 
CHILE: ADJUSTMENT POLICIES, AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY / A. Sanfuentes 119 
II 
Trends and results 
1. Output 
When the sum of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) for 1974 to 1981 is compared with the 
total for 1964 to 1971, it can be seen that the 
product of the agriculture and forestry sector 
grew 17.1%, i.e., slower than the total GDP and 
the population growth rate; this means a decline 
of 1.2% in per capita terms. 
These figures conceal very dissimilar perfor-
mances within the sector. Traditional crops, 
which accounted for about 30% of the value of 
production, fell as a result of the decline in the 
area sown from 1 270 000 ha on average in the 
1960s to 1 012 000 ha in 1980-1982. The main 
crops affected were wheat, beet, rape and mari-
golds, for after the trade liberalization it was 
cheaper to import them. 
There is evidence that vegetable production 
may have increased during the period. 
The rise in fruit production was spectacular. 
The reasons for this abundance are to be found in 
the fruit-growing plan carried out in the second 
half of the 1970s and in the export incentive 
entailed by the establishment of a high and sta-
ble exchange rate. These circumstances favoured 
investment and the incorporation of technology, 
and productivity showed a substantial improve-
ment. The area planted increased from 63 900 
ha in 1974 to 86 800 ha in 1981, while output 
rose from 545 900 to 885 400 tons. 
Livestock increased at a slow but steady rate; 
the production of milk and poultry meat rose in 
this subsector but the production of sheep and 
eggs fell. 
2. Foreign trade 
Farm exports showed a remarkable increase 
from US$73.5 million in 1971 to US$807.3 mil-
lion in 1981, with a consequent increase in their 
share in the total from 7.6 to 20.5 % in the same 
period. Fresh fruit, timber and forestry deriva-
tives contributed most to this increase. If these 
latter items are excluded by reason of their large 
industrial component, the figures fall to US$41.5 
and US$548.3 million in 1971 and 1981 respec-
tively, and the share in the total rises from 4.3 to 
13.9%. 
Imports also increased substantially from 
US$186.9 to US$410.1 million in the same 
period. However, their share in the total fell 
from 16 to 6.1%. The same trend is observed 
when food imports are included. 
The result of this performance was that the 
sector's trade balance, which had been in deficit, 
moved into the black. 
3. Investment and borrowing 
Although there is no reliable information about 
investment, various estimates indicate that it 
declined by about 5 3 % in the public sector i,pub-
lic agricultural expenditure on capital goods), 
while private investment rose between 1965-
1969 and 1974-1979 from US$17 million to 
US$36.3 million as an annual average. 
Within this development, it is estimated 
that investment in equipment and machinery 
fell sharply, while investment in livestock and 
fruit farms rose sharply. These figures are not 
reliable and critics cite other figures which indi-
cate that in fact private investment in 1974-1979 
was unchanged or lower than in 1965-1969. 
The forestry sector has better figures which 
show that investment grew. Proof of this is 
provided by the expansion of the planted area, as 
an annual average, from 28 212 to 79 586 ha in 
this period. This performance was certainly 
influenced by the subsidies granted to this 
activity. 
Lending to the sector increased rapidly in 
real terms, although at a slower rate than in 
other activities. It is important to stress that this 
lending was concentrated in short-term obliga-
tions and, moreover, that there was a deep cut in 
resources for the peasant sectors. 
According to the available information, the 
ratio of the volume of credit to the sector's value 
added rose from 35 to 76% and then to 9 1 % in 
1965-1970, 1981 and 1982 respectively. The 
heaviest borrowers in this scenario were the 
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small and medium-sized farmers who, 
moreover, concentrated their obligations in the 
short term as they lacked liquidity and working 
capital. 
4. Relative prices and profits 
^Leaving aside the question of the validity of the 
consumer price Índex (CPI), food prices rose less 
than the overall index between 1974 and 1981 
(73 against 85 times) and the average annual 
rates were lower throughout the period, except 
in 1976 and 1981. However, a comparison of 
prices between 1970 and 1981 produces opposite 
results; it shows that the food item showed a 
relative improvement in 1970-1974, contrary to 
the expectation of official policy. 
The wholesale price index (WPI) shows that 
food prices rose more than the overall index 
(117 against 112 times), that this increase was 
concentrated in the period 1975-1976, and that 
the ratio was reversed between 1977 and 1981. 
Both indexes seem to show that the trade 
mark-ups between wholesalers and final consu-
mers fell in comparison with other activities. 
This could be a result of the trade liberalization, 
although in view of the unreliability of the 
indexes it is difficult to assert this with any 
certainty. It can however be said that the terms 
of trade did not improve for the agricultural 
sector as a whole. 
The prices of inputs which ceased to receive 
subsidies rose, as did those of fertilizers and 
seeds. Petroleum and electricity prices also rose. 
Financial costs increased, as already pointed 
out, and it is estimated that the revaluation of 
properties may have resulted in higher direct 
taxation. The only cost element that certainly 
fell was wages. 
It can thus be inferred that farm profits did 
not improve in the period 1974-1981, indeed the 
available data indicate that they deteriorated. 
This is in global terms, for certain activities such 
as fruit production performed very well while 
others clearly declined. This heterogeneity was 
also found at the regional level. 
5. Employment, wages and 
income distribution 
Employment showed a slight increase in abso-
lute terms from 480 300 persons employed in 
1973 to 511 400 in 1981. There was thus a break 
in the sector's tendency to shed manpower 
owing to increased productivity. It is estimated 
that employment in the sector fell 31 % between 
I960 and 1973. Any variations in this trend were 
due to the fact that drops in real wages and 
social-security costs and the improved negotiat-
ing power of the workers acted as a stimulus on 
labour-intensive activities; the higher unem-
ployment and lower real wages in the towns 
discouraged migration from the countryside, and 
the increased subdivision of properties may have 
encouraged greater retention of labour, although 
with lower productivity. 
Nevertheless, employment grew slower 
than the population, and unemployment thus 
rose from 2% in 1966-1970 to 5.7% in 1974-
1981. 
As to income distribution, there is very little 
information on which comparisons can be based. 
However, in view of the greater heterogeneity in 
the sector and according to the information 
which is available, it can be asserted that the 
worst poverty is concentrated in rural areas. This 
assertion is supported by the existence of a back-
ward sector made up of smallholders (about 
180 000 properties) who receive little or no 
attention from the government, a sector which 
was swollen by the plots allocated under the 
agrarian reform and by a large mass of farm 
workers without permanent jobs living in very 
precarious conditions. 
It is important to stress that the available 
information shows good efficiency indices for 
the smallholders —evidence of an unused busi-
ness capacity. 
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III 
The crisis and the adjustment policies 
X. The cri six 
After the recession in 1975-1976 the gross 
domestic product grew rapidly in the next five 
years and exceeded the all-time highs in 1980 
and 1981. Inflation fell founder 10% a year, real 
wages increased, the fiscal targets of the govern-
ment itself were surpassed, with surpluses 
between 1979 and 1981, and the Central Bank 
steadily accumulated reserves. 
It was in this context that the government 
promulgated the so-called "seven moderniza-
tions" which consisted, inter alia, in reform of 
the labour laws to make the jobs market more 
flexible, the social-security reform which privat-
ized this activity, a new mining law to facilitate 
large foreign investments in this area, and the 
education reform. However, the economy had a 
number of very serious problems, including: 
i) The rise in unemployment to 11%, an 
exceptionally high level in historical terms. 
If the persons enrolled in the Minimum 
Employment Programme are included, the 
level rises to over 15%. 
Ü) The low level of investment during the 
1970s and the low rate of national savings, 
which fell from 16.4 to 13.6% between 
1961-1970 and 1974-1981. 
iii) The worsening of income distribution. The 
1969 and 1978 household surveys illustrate 
this development: while the poorest 20% 
saw their share fall from 7.6 to only 5.2%, 
the 20% of families with the highest 
incomes improved their position, with their 
share rising from 44.5 to 51% of the 
national income. 
iv) The heavy borowing by the private sector, 
which enabled it to acquire assets. This was 
intensified by the close relationship between 
the owners of the big companies and the 
banks; as a result the financial system 
became particularly vulnerable. Lending to 
the private sector increased from 6.9 to 
23-8% of GDP between 1970 and 1981, 
while in foreign currency it exploded from 
US$78 million in 1970 to US$5 549 million 
in 1981, a level equivalent to 16.8% of GDP. 
In addition to these problems, the crisis trig-
gered a series of macroeconomic imbalances. 
They included an enormous deficit in the current 
account of the balance of payments, which rose 
from US$1 088 and US$1 189 million in 1978 
and 1979 to US$1 971 and US$4 814 million in 
1980 and 1981. These figures are equivalent 
respectively to 7.1, 5.7, 7.7 and 16.3% of GDP in 
those years. The causes of this phenomenon 
included: the fixing of the exchange rate at 39 
pesos to the dollar in June 1979 and its mainte-
nance in the following years despite continued 
inflation at levels higher than the international 
rates (the CPI rose 67% between June 1979 and 
June 1981, while the United States CPI rose only 
25.2%); and the standardization of tariffs at 
10% which helped to make imported goods 
cheaper. 
These two measures produced changes in 
the relative prices of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods. The result was that exports 
increased from US$4 190 million in 1979 to 
US$6 558 million in 1981, while exports, which 
had been rising rapidly, came virtually to a stand-
still, increasing from US$3 835 million in 1979 
to US$3 960 million in 1981. 
These imbalances were aggravated by the 
deterioration in the terms of trade caused by the 
5% rise in import prices and the 10% fall in 
export prices, which pushed the trade balance 
deficit up by US$780 million. The higher inter-
est rates in the international market increased it 
a further US$200 million. However, these 
US$980 million account for only a quarter of the 
total deficit of US$4 800 million in the current 
account in 1981. 
The foreign debt grew enormously as a 
result of the financial liberalization, as external 
saving came to take the place of internal saving, 
which fell from 15.5% of GDP in 1980 to 8.5% 
in 1981, in which year external saving accounted 
for 66% of total saving. 
In short, there was a serious imbalance in the 
economy between the product level and the 
expenditure level, an imbalance which was 
financed by external resources. Proof of this is 
that the long- and medium-term debt rose from 
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US$7 507 million in 1979 to US$12 553 million 
in 1981. The situation became unsupportable 
from 1981, when the prime rate rose to 20% a 
year. 
The other economic distortion was in the 
domestic financial system. The rapid growth of 
bank lending, facilitated by the simplification of 
access to external resources and aggravated by 
the persistence of high interest rates over a long 
period, ended by causing excessive debt, with a 
wave of bank and business failures. 
2. The automatic adjustment 
(June 1981 to April 1982) 
The exchange-rate slippage caused serious prob-
lems, for the avalanche of imports displaced 
domestic production and discouraged exporters, 
this on top of the abrupt increase in the debt. 
The government authorities maintained 
that the existing model possessed automatic 
mechanisms for resolving this situation, and so 
no new measures were needed, except partial 
ones. As they saw the problem, there was excess 
aggregate demand but devaluation was not the 
remedy, for it would not affect the balance of 
payments or change relative prices, and would 
only lead to more inflation. 
The idea was that the Central Bank should 
maintain a neutral monetary policy and issue 
money only when foreign exchange came in. 
Otherwise, there would be a loss of international 
reserves, an equivalent cut in the money supply 
and a higher interest rate, which would lead to a 
decline in expenditure and imports to a level 
compatible with the inflow of external credit, 
and exports would therefore increase owing to 
the fall in domestic demand. 
What actually happened was that as infla-
tion fell and the nominal interest rate was main-
tained, the real interest rate rose considerably in 
early 1981. Furthermore, the amount of money 
in private hands declined in the second half of 
1981 owing to the reduction of the Central 
Bank's reserves. 
Two other factors will also have affected the 
increase in the interest rate: i) the favourable 
expectations about the future, which increased 
the demand for loans to a level above the 
available supply of external credit; in addition to 
business requirements, there was borrowing for 
consumption encouraged by the low prices of 
imported goods; ii) increased demand owing to 
the capitalization of interest; furthermore, the 
banks avoided declaring these loans as 
uncollectable in order to prevent administrative 
intervention by the State as long as a "pardon" 
was expected; Hi) a tax system which encouraged 
businesses to borrow and not to use their own 
resources. 
The higher interest rates and the competi-
tion of imported goods had considerable reces-
sive effects on construction and manufacturing 
which were passed on to trade and services. The 
over-indebtedness caused serious liquidity prob-
lems which made intervention and the liquida-
tion of eight financial bodies unavoidable. 
On the other hand, the downward reaction 
of prices was slow and insignificant. The CPI 
rose slowly up to January 1982 and stabilized in 
the first half of the year. Wholesale prices, mea-
sured by the wholesale price index (WPI), 
recorded falls, but smaller ones than needed for 
the restoration of the balances. This was due to 
the rigidities of the Chilean economy itself and 
the time-lag in the operation of policies; the 
habituation of businessmen to inflation but not 
to deflation, which was why they did not behave 
as the authorities expected; and the difficulty of 
lowering production costs owing to: i) the 
impossibility of lower prices for imported inputs 
with the dollar at 39 pesos; ii) the increase in 
financial costs resulting from the rise in interest 
rates; in) taxation which, being basically indi-
rect, was proportional to other costs; and iv) the 
legal regulations which required the automatic 
adjustment of wages in step with past inflation. 
In August 1981, with the automatic adjustment 
in full flow, there was a general upward adjust-
ment of wages and salaries, which did not begin 
to fall until May 1982. 
The failure of the policy of automatic adjust-
ment caused a considerable recession. Busi-
nesses opted for production cutbacks, with 
consequent effects on employment. 
3. The phase of anarchy 
(April 1982 to March 1983) 
The new economic team made some changes 
which, although important, did not alter the 
essential nature of the model. They included the 
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following: i) devaluation in June 1982 followed 
by adoption of the mechanism of minidevalua-
tions; partial exchange controls in September 
1982; Ü) abolition of the automatic adjustment 
of wages in step with inflation, leaving matters 
open to voluntary negotiation; in) tax measures 
to prevent any reduction in tax revenue; 
increases in certain taxes such as vehicle licenses, 
land taxes, advance payment of the general sup-
plementary tax, and a labour tax surcharge; and 
iv) intervention in the main banks and financial 
corporations to keep them in business; this also 
had an indirect effect on the bigger related 
businesses. 
The economic results of these changes were 
as follows: 
Although the dollar reached 72.39 pesos in 
December 1982, an increase of 85 %, the 
government did not immediately institute 
exchange controls; this triggered speculation 
and the Central Bank lost part of its 
international reserves, which fell from 
US$3 775 million at the end of 1981 to 
US$2 578 million a year later, and to US$1 486 
million in April 1983-
There was also a sharp drop in imports, a 
slight fall in exports and increased payment of 
interest on the foreign debt despite the lower 
international rates. The current account deficit 
which stood at US$2 382 million in 1983, was 
covered by a new inflow of capital (US$1 304 
million) and by Central Bank resources. 
The situation became unsupportable. The 
inflow of capital from abroad fell dramatically, 
and reserves were at critical levels; all this 
persuaded the government to seek rescheduling 
of the foreign debt while suspending 
repayments. 
Other factors also contributed to this state of 
affairs. A profound economic recession: the 
gross domestic product fell 14.3%, with 
agriculture the least affected sector, declining 
only 3.3% despite everything. Industry fell by 
21.6% and construction by 29%- On the demand 
side, private consumption declined 14.4% and 
investment 37.1%, producing an investment 
rate of 9.6% of gross domestic product. 
Unemployment rose to 23-7% in September 
1982, and to over 30% if the emergency 
programmes are included. Nominal wages 
continued to rise till April 1982, then began their 
decline. 
Inflation broke out again as a result of the 
devaluations; the consumer price index rose 
21.1% between May and December 1982, and 
the wholesale price index rose by 45.7%, while 
the nominal amount of money in the private 
sector fell 1.4%. 
These results exacerbated the problems of 
income distribution and extreme poverty. 
Public finances were in deficit for the first 
time in three years. Real fiscal expenditure 
remained constant, but tax revenue fell by 
13.8%. The fiscal imbalance was 8.1% of 
expenditure. 
4. The programme agreed with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(March 1983 to December 1986) 
A standby arrangement required as a condition 
of renegotiation of the debt was signed for the 
period 1983-1984. The Chilean and IMF 
authorities reached remarkably rapid agreement 
both on the diagnosis and on the remedy. In this 
agreement the government did not exploit the 
fact that most of the debt was private nor did it 
refuse to accept the use of mechanisms which 
treated the State as the new debtor. 
The agreed programme covered a cutback of 
the fiscal deficit by restriction of public spend-
ing, reduction of the sector's size, trade liberali-
zation, use of neutral instruments in lending, 
tariffs and the exchange rate, decontrol of prices, 
and wage restrictions. In fact the policies in force 
up to the crisis were maintained but with a more 
structured macroeconomic programme. 
This policy has continued up to the present. 
The foreign debt was again rescheduled in 1985 
and another agreement was reached with the 
IMF, with a contribution from the World Bank in 
the form of a structural adjustment loan. 
The main goal of the strategy was to secure 
balance in the external sector and lower infla-
tion. The devaluations and the tax drawback 
(10% of their value) favoured exports, while 
imports were controlled by the high exchange 
rate and restrictions on the growth of the GDP 
and the national income designed to maintain 
them at levels compatible with the supply of 
foreign exchange. 
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Small changes were made in tariffs policy; 
customs tariffs rose uniformly to 35% in Sep-
tember 1984 and then fell to 30% in February 
1985 and 20% in July that year. Some differen-
tial tariffs were introduced in verified cases of 
dumping and protection measures were estab-
lished for some products, several of them of 
agricultural origin. 
Partial exchange controls were introduced, 
regulating the acquisition of foreign currency for 
previously authorized foreign payments, and the 
level of reserves at the end of 1982 was main-
tained in an effort not to incur arrears in foreign 
payments. 
The fiscal policy sought to balance public 
finances and reduce the sector's size and, in con-
junction with a tight monetary policy, output 
and income were held down at levels compatible 
with the anti-inflation targets. An attempt was 
also made to cut interest rates by means of a 
"level" suggested periodically by the Central 
Bank. 
Several steps were taken to solve the prob-
lem of excessive internal debt: creation of a pre-
ferential dollar for foreign-currency debtors and 
the option of converting the debts into national 
currency on advantageous terms; rescheduling of 
national-currency debts, transforming them into 
long-term loans at subsidized interest rates; and 
special rescheduling for mortgagees and 
snippers. 
Furthermore, the banks also received assist-
ance in the form of purchase by the Central Bank 
of their matured portfolios and doubtful debts in 
exchange for notes payable from future sur-
pluses; direct subsidies by means of interest rate 
differentials in the purchase and sale of notes; 
and, lastly, loans to prevent cessation of payment 
owing to illiquidity. These measures were the 
main reason for the expansion of lending and 
new issues. 
At the same time cuts were made in the 
remuneration of public employees and the pen-
sions paid by the social security system. 
In contrast to the greater participation of the 
State through these interventions, steps were 
also taken to reprivatize the banks and main 
conglomerates. These consisted of subsidies for 
new owners, preferential dividends, interest-
free loans, tax rebates, and the use of foreign-
debt notes, among others. 
The aim of the employment policy was to 
keep labour costs low, and the government 
therefore met part of the cost of social security 
benefits and introduced new emergency 
programmes. 
5. Economic results 
After its large drop in 1983 the gross domestic 
product recovered slowly but did not return to its 
pre-crisis levels. In 1985 it was still 7 .1% below 
the 1981 level in absolute terms and 13.1% in 
per capita terms, at levels similar to those of 
1968. 
Unemployment took a considerable turn for 
the worse during the crisis, with open unem-
ployment increasing from 420 400 to 923 900 
between March 1981 and September 1982. The 
unemployment rate rose from 11 to 23.7% in 
the same period and, if the special jobs pro-
grammes are taken into account, unemployment 
amounted to 35% of the labour force. The situa-
tion began to improve in mid-1983, and in Sep-
tember 1986 open unemployment stood at 
13.9%, or 19% if the emergency programmes 
are included. The causes of this improvement 
were the recovery of output, the large increase in 
informal low-productivity jobs and the mainte-
nance of wages at low levels. 
Wages increased up to May 1982 but then 
fell to their lowest level in mid-1985, showing a 
drop of 21.8%. Since then there has been a slow 
recovery, but without a return to the pre-crisis 
levels. 
The scant data available on income distribu-
tion indicate a deterioration in the situation. 
Inflation accelerated as a result of the devalua-
tions to rates of 27.3% in 1983, 19.9% in 1984, 
and 30.7% in 1985, when it began to slow down. 
The balance of payments was restored to 
balance in 1982 owing to the fall in imports. 
Imports fell again in the following years, while 
the value of exports stood still. In order to meet 
the current account deficits it was necessary to 
resort to new foreign borrowing and use of 
reserves; this led to a larger outflow of resources 
in service payments. These payments amounted 
to 51 % of the value of exports in 1982-1985. The 
result was that the foreign debt grew swiftly 
from US$11 207 million in 1980 to US$15 591 
million ¡n 1981 and US$20 842 million at the 
end of 1985. 
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IV 
Agricultural policies during the crisis 
1. Price bands 
This was the most important change and it con-
sisted of government intervention in certain 
products such as wheat, oil crops, beet and, to a 
lesser extent, milk and dairy products. In April 
1982 it was decided that the Industria Azucarera 
Nacional S.A. (IANSA) (National Sugar Corpo-
ration) would begin to issue contracts for beet 
sowing for a period of four to five harvests with a 
view to absorbing labour. In April 1983 a min-
imum price was announced for wheat, guaran-
teed by specific tariffs if the import cost was 
below the stipulated price. 
Price bands were set in the 1984/1985 sea-
son for wheat and oil crops; in March or April 
each year the price was announced for the period 
running from 1 November to 30 October of the 
next year. 
A tariff surcharge was imposed on imported 
sugar injune 1984 but replaced by a price band in 
the 1985/1986 season. 
Minimum reference prices were set for milk 
and dairy products and flour in September 1983, 
and customs surcharges were subsequently 
imposed on milk. 
These measures had a great influence on the 
areas sown and the country's level of self-
sufficiency. Between 1982/1983 and 1985/1986 
the area of annual crops expanded from 872 647 
to 1138 770 ha (a 30.5% increase over 
1981/1982). Wheat accounted for much of this 
expansion, with an increase of 58.5% in the area 
sown, together with oil crops and beet. The 
improved yields made large production increases 
possible. 
These improvements were due to the deva-
luations, higher tariffs and price bands, which 
made exports more expensive and reduced the 
producers' risks. 
Trade mark-ups showed a considerable drop, 
owing partly to the lower wages and the sector's 
reduced risks. 
In the case of sugar, IANSA operated from 
1982 to 1984 with no other protection than the 
devaluations and the general increase of tariffs. 
Oil crops, however, operated with bands of 
between 41 and 44% with no need for sur-
charges, for international prices remained high. 
Milk and dairy products required a surcharge to 
offset the exports subsidies introduced by the 
coun t r i e s of the E u r o p e a n Economic 
Community. 
Self-sufficiency was almost achieved in the 
1986/1987 grain and beet harvests; this worried 
the authorities, for surpluses could not be sold in 
the external market owing to its low prices. The 
reason for this was that the estimates for the 
price bands did not take into account the long-
term trends of the products in the international 
market. 
2. Special credits for agriculture 
Despite the criterion of neutrality in credit pol-
icy, steps were taken to finance production 
(through the State Bank and IANSA in the spe-
cific case of beet), with the harvests, and not 
assets, as the only surety requirement. Warrants 
were also introduced with the product as surety 
as a means of stabilizing prices between 
harvests. 
In addition, in November 1984 70% of the 
outstanding obligations of former smallholders 
of the Agrarian Reform Corporation (CORA) 
were forgiven and the remaining 30% made 
payable with adjustment, but without interest. 
The debts of the small producers served by 
INDAP were rescheduled with State Bank 
financing. 
3. The forestry policy 
A special forestry development programme was 
introduced at the end of 1982, together with 
other programmes to provide seasonal employ-
ment. The best monthly average was 15 584 
workers in 1985, with a subsequent low of only 
5 916 in 1986. The most important measure was 
the increase from 75 to 90% in the subsidy of the 
cost of forestation carried out by the private 
sector. 
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4. Irrigation policy 5. Transfer of technology 
An eight-year programme was introduced in 
January 1986 to cover 7596 of the costs of irriga-
tion and drainage works and the necessary 
equipment, provided they did not exceed 12 000 
Promotion Units (Unidades de Fomento - UF) 
(about US$192 000). 
Mention must be made of the successful experi-
ment with the Technology Transfer Groups 
Programme set up in 1982 by the Agricultural 
Research Institute (INIA). 
V 
Effects of the adjustment policies on the sector 
1. Output 
If 1981 is taken as the reference year, it can be 
seen that the sector has developed more favoura-
bly than the economy as a whole. While the 
overall gross domestic product fell 14.7% in 
1983, the sectoral product fell only 5.7%. Its 
recovery was also faster, for in 1985 the sectoral 
GDP was 6.7% higher than in 1981, whereas the 
overall economy recorded a drop of 7.1%. 
Accordingly, the contribution of agriculture and 
forestry to the overall product rose from 7.5 % in 
1981 to 8.8% in 1986. 
Crop performances had a decisive impact on 
this development. Their recovery was also due to 
the wide margin for substitution of food imports 
despite the low consumption resulting from the 
crisis. This is demonstrated clearly by the supply 
composition of the protected crops. 
In contrast to this, the livestock items fell by 
8.9% between 1981 and 1985, while vegetables 
made a slow recovery. 
Fruit-farming is the activity to have benefit-
ted most from the macroeconomic policies 
pursued since 1982. In this case the devaluations 
acted in concert with the fall in wage and finan-
cial costs. Since this activity reacts to economic 
stimulus with a time-lag, the figures must be 
adjusted; between 1974 and 1981 the growth 
rate of the area planted was 4.7 %, rising to 6.8% 
between 1982 and 1985. The total area of fruit 
farms increased from 65 630 ha in 1973 to 
116 650 ha in 1985. 
Forestry activities also expanded rapidly up 
to 1980, and then fell sharply in 1981 and 1982 
(26.6%), with a subsequent recovery to a 1985 
level almost equal to that of 1980. 
2. Public expenditure 
Public expenditure has fallen sharply since 
before the restrictions imposed by the crisis, as 
can be seen from its real drop of 44% between 
1970 and 1981. Public resources under this item 
fell even further in 1982; they began to recover 
in 1983, but by reason of the increase in service 
of the public debt made by INDAP. Leaving this 
factor out of account, the budget for the Ministry 
of Agriculture was 10% smaller in 1986 than in 
1981. 
3. Profits and relative prices 
When the movement of the overall WPI is com-
pared with the index of agricultural products, it 
can be seen that between 1979 and 1982 the WPI 
rose 63.3% and the agricultural index only 
39-8%, indicating the deterioration in agricul-
ture's terms of grade as a result of the trade 
liberalization and cheap imports. This trend was 
reversed in 1983 but things deteriorated again in 
1984-1985, indicating that the better prices for 
wheat and oil crops did not extend to the rest of 
the sector. Similar conclusions can be drawn 
from analysis of CPI movements. 
It can be concluded from this picture that 
drastic changes occurred in the structure of pri-
ces in favour of wheat, oil crops and beet. 
With respect to export crops, the CPI rose 
119.2% between 1981 and 1985 and the WPI 
178%, while the official value of the dollar 
increased 312.5%, a situation which reflects the 
relative improvement in these activities. 
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4. The trade balance 
Imports suffered a large decline. If all interme-
diate, consumer and farm goods and foodstuffs 
are taken into account, imports amounted to 
US$1 024 million in 1980 and US$250 million in 
1985. 
Exports are more sensitive to the impact of 
exogenous factors than to internal policy mea-
sures. Commodities showed an increase from 
US$283 million in 1980 to 452 million in 1985. 
This increase was due almost exclusively to fresh 
fruit. The value of foreign sales of agro-
industrial products remained unchanged or fell, 
while the value of forestry derivatives, which are 
hard to absorb in the sector, was around US$224 
million. 
When total imports of farm and food items 
are compared with total exports of commodities, 
the balance shows a deficit of US$741 and 
US$515 million respectively in 1980 and 1981, 
but it later moved into the black, with a surplus 
of US$202 million. 
After the profound transformations caused by 
the shifts in relative prices between 1982 and 
1987, the agricultural sector has began to operate 
at a more stable rhythm. 
If current macroeconomic policies are main-
tained in the future, the sector's strength will 
depend on its exports capacity and the develop-
ment of domestic demand. The most modern 
activities —fruit-growing and forestry— ought 
to expand rapidly as a result of the sizeable 
investments already made. Production of 
5. Employment and wages 
During 1981 and up toMarch 1982 employment 
in the farming sector grew faster than the 
national rate. There were large drops in employ-
ment in September 1982 and March and Sep-
tember 1983, consistent with what was 
happening in other economic activities. The sub-
sequent recovery was slower than in the other 
sectors: the growth rate of jobs in agriculture 
was 2.4% between 1981 and 1986, as against 
11.2% in other activities. 
Nevertheless, the number of unemployed 
increased at a slower rate (6.7%) than in the rest 
of the country (45.2%) in the same period. This 
is connected with the different growth rates of 
the labour force: the national rate was 14.1%, 
while in farming and forestry the rate was only 
2.7%. 
No suitable index is available for an analysis 
of movements of farm wages. On the assump-
tion that they generally keep step with the min-
imum legal wage, they will have fallen by 34.7% 
between 1982 and 1985. 
legumes and vegetables can be included in these 
activities. 
On the other hand, the prospects for 
livestock and basic crops are not so rosy, for they 
depend on the development of internal 
consumption, and this will grow slowly owing to 
the poor income elasticity of its demand. 
The main cause of the sector's instability is 
rooted in the peasant economy, where the possi-
bilities of improvement depend on radical alter-
ation of the policies used in the past decade. 
VI 
Future prospects 
